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T
he hazard and operability, or HAZOP, study is a prime method for the identi cation of
hazards on process plants. This is the third in a series of papers which describes
progress in the emulation of hazard identi cation in the style of HAZOP. The work
reported is embodied in a computer aid for hazard identi cation, or HAZOP emulator, HAZID.
The HAZID code is one of a suite of codes developed as part of the STOPHAZ project. The
present paper describes the  uid model system and the evaluation of consequences.
Companion papers describe: an overview of HAZID, with an account of HAZOP and
HAZOP emulation, and of the issues underlying it; the unit model system; the evaluation
and improvement of HAZID using case studies and other methods; some development topics.
Conclusions from the work are given in the  nal paper.
Keywords: hazard identication; HAZOP; computer-assisted hazard identication; physical
and chemical properties.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is the third in a series on computer aiding of
hazard identi cation and describes the  uid model system
in AutoHAZID, as well as a system for the evaluation of
consequences. The content of the other papers is outlined
in the  rst paper1.
Firstly, we identify the need for a system to eliminate
infeasible results from the HAZID results table. Then we
introduce the method used to tackle this problem: fault path
validation. The  uid model system (FMS) which performs
fault path validation, using predicates and functions, is then
described. One particularly interesting class of validation
check is explored brie y, namely the validation of fault
paths by evaluating quantitative limits on the magnitude of
deviations in process variables. The FMS also supports
compatibility checks on unwanted  uid interactions, and
these are discussed brie y. A description of the different
sub-systems within the FMS is then given. A systematic
method for consequence evaluation is outlined and the paper
then concludes.
The hazard identi cation algorithm implemented in
AutoHAZID is based on tracing the fault paths in the
plant model, which is itself derived from the unit models.
The algorithm generates a large number of potential ‘faults’.
At this stage no account is taken of information on the
phases, physical properties, etc., of the speci c  uids in
the plant. Hence many of the ‘faults’ thrown up at this
stage may well not be physically possible and even if they
are, they may not be signi cant.
There is therefore a need to prune the fault paths produced
by search, if the signi cant faults in the output report are
not to be swamped by insigni cant ones. The methods used
for pruning the output include  ltering to remove repeti-
tions in the output report (described in the  rst paper of
this series1), and fault path validation, described here. It is
also important to differentiate between those consequences
which are of signi cance and those which are not; this is
achieved by classifying and ranking the consequences, as
described in the later section of this paper, on consequence
evaluation.
In an appreciable proportion of cases the feasibility of a
fault path depends on the physical and chemical properties
of the  uid(s) present. In such cases the query can in
principle be resolved by calling a  uid model to determine
whether the fault is a valid one.
For example, one potential consequence of Low tempera-
ture is freezing, and hence blockage, but if for the cause
concerned the temperature at the location in question cannot
fall below the freezing point of the  uid at that point,
even under fault conditions, the fault is not a valid one. In
order to resolve such queries AutoHAZID makes calls
to the  uid model system during hazard identi cation, to
verify the feasibility of identi ed hazards.
A further aspect of the use of the FMS to resolve queries
is concerned with the matter of  uid compatibility. It is
generally, though not universally, assumed in a HAZOP
that the designer has considered questions of compatibility
between the  uids, and between the  uids and the materials
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of construction when the plant is operating according to
the design intent. If deviations occur, however, there may
be unintended contacts between two  uids or between a
 uid and a material, and in some such cases there may
be an incompatibility. In AutoHAZID, any unintended
 uid- uid contact raises a query, which is resolved by
the FMS. Checks on unintended contact between  uids
and materials of construction could also be checked, but have
not been implemented in the current version of the FMS.
FAULT PATH VALIDATION
The operation of the  uid model system (FMS) is treated
as a process of fault path validation. For a given initiating
fault, AutoHAZID produces a chain of arcs in the plant
signed directed graph (SDG) model which represents the
propagation of the fault through a number of deviations to
a  nal consequence. This chain of in uence is termed a
‘fault path’. The FMS attempts to validate the fault path so
produced by making use of qualitative and quantitative
information and calculations.
This implies that rules are formulated de ning checks
to be made and that these checks are activated at the
appropriate point in the program. The checks themselves
are attached to arcs in the plant SDG model, derived from
the unit SDG models, as conditions on those arcs. The
checks are activated by the HAZOP emulation algorithm
when it validates the completed paths produced by the
search. The meaning of each condition is such that, if it is
proven to be false, the arc is considered invalid and the
fault path containing it is deleted.
Validation proceeds by taking the fault path as a whole
and evaluating  rst the condition attached to the initiating
fault, then any conditions attached to the intermediate
arcs, and  nally the condition attached to the consequence.
If any of these conditions fails, the fault path is deleted.
Thus, the validation is not con ned to an evaluation of the
feasibility of the consequence alone.
Predicates and Functions in the FMS
The checks just described rely on a system of predicate
and function de nitions in the  uid modelling system.
These allow the FMS to integrate the various sub-systems
which are used for deciding whether a condition is valid,
or used for locating the physical property information about
the plant.
The term ‘‘predicate’’ is used here to describe a logical
condition which evaluates to either true or false. The
predicate has a name and a number of arguments, which
de ne the information needed by the system to decide the
truth of the predicate.
An example of a predicate is  ammable(Port), which is
used to decide whether the  uid present at a given port
in the plant model is  ammable or not. Here Port is a
variable which can be given a value such as ‘out’. When the
arguments of the predicate are given, the FMS can evaluate
the condition and return an answer (true or false). Predi-
cates may sometimes be de ned which do not have any
arguments.
The FMS also allows the use of ‘functions’. These appear
similar to predicates in that they involve a name and a list
of arguments given in brackets, but they return values
which in general may be of any type. The type and format
of the return values produced will depend on the function
itself. The functions allow the developer of a predicate to
perform a limited amount of computation within the
de nition of the predicate.
An example of a function is get_uid(Port), which
consults the plant model to  nd the  uid at the given port
location, and returns the information in a speci c struc-
ture containing the data about the  uid. Another example
is vapour_pressure(Fluid), which takes an argument in
the format returned by get_uid(Port) and calculates
the vapour pressure of the  uid at its temperature. The
temperature is among the data provided by the Fluid
argument.
The evaluation of predicates and functions by the FMS
makes use of a certain amount of context information
in addition to the arguments given in the condition
attached to the SDG in the unit model. This infor-
mation includes implicit access to the  uids in the plant,
the arcs in the fault path and other parts of the plant
model.
Some special predicates and functions in the FMS can
be used in a shorthand form as ‘in x’ operators, between
the items to which they refer. These correspond to the
commonly used operators for arithmetic and logical
operations and numerical comparisons. The FMS attends
to displaying these operators in an appropriate way and
also parses them from the unit model library de nitions
of predicates and functions, taking care of the operator
precedence which applies. Each of the in x operators has
an appropriate longhand form, which uses the convention
that the name of the predicate or function starts with the
letters ‘op_’. These operators make the de nitions of other
predicates and functions far more readable.
A list of the predicates and functions used in AutoHAZID
is given in Table 1. For brevity the in x operators have
been excluded.
The predicates and functions are de ned at the start of
the unit model library, using predicate() and function()
statements, which specify the name and arguments of
the function/predicate using dummy variables for each
of the arguments. Also speci ed is a character giving the
type of predicate or function that is being de ned and
hence mapping the item onto a speci c system which is
able to evaluate it:
· ‘C’—If the type is C, the predicate or function is de ned
within the AutoHAZID program.
· ‘V’—If the type is V, the query is handled by the  uid
model/rule system developed by VTT.
· ‘D’—If the type is D, the predicate or function is de ned
in terms of other predicates or functions and the de nition
is given as an extra argument.
Numerical Limits
Often, a fault path generated by the graph search
algorithm in HAZID is not feasible because one of the
deviations in it cannot assume the magnitude required to
produce the consequence concerned. This problem arises
because of the qualitative nature of the equipment models
used to model the plant.
If numerical limits can be set to the magnitude of
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deviations, this information can be used to remove such
infeasible fault paths. Each fault path is then treated as
conditional on the occurrence of a deviation of suf cient
magnitude.
The  uid model system supports the propagation of
numerical limits on the size of deviations in process
variables, so that for a given fault path the maximum and
minimum limits for the deviation caused by the initiating
fault can be propagated through the path to the consequence,
which is conditional on the deviation being of suf cient
magnitude.
As an illustration, consider the case of pump rupture
due to overpressure of the casing. Often this can occur only
if the pump is dead heading. The following are arcs from
the model for a pump:
arc([deviation, [morePressure,out] ],1,
[consequence, [`possible casing over-
pressure rupture’,
exceed_design_pressure(out)] ]),
arc([out,noFlow],1,[out,pressure],
assign_max_pressure(out,dead_heading
_pressure)),
The predicate exceed_design_pressure(Port) checks the
maximum pressure determined so far for the given port
against the maximum design, or allowable, pressure to
check whether the latter is exceeded. The arc containing the
noFlow to pressure link is present in order to test this
susceptibility. If dead heading occurs, the pressure becomes
the dead heading pressure, which is then compared with the
maximum allowable pressure.
A similar predicate exceed_design_vacuum(Port) checks
the minimum pressure of a unit against the minimum
allowable pressure, to check for vacuum collapse. In order
to utilize such numerical checks it is a convention of the
plant database that the values of allowable pressures and
temperatures are stored in attributes called max_allowa-
ble_pressure, min_allowable_pressure, max_allowable_
temperature and min_allowable_temperature.
The development of a set of rules for the derivation
of numerical values is a substantial exercise in its own
right. Some concepts on which such rules might be based
are discussed in the  nal paper in this series2.
COMPATIBILITY CHECKS
The account given so far has dealt with the queries
generated by fault paths associated with deviations derived
from the unit models. A further set of queries is generated
by  uid- uid and  uid-material contacts due to deviations.
A compatibility check is performed whenever, at a given
location, two  uids mix together as a result of a deviation
which do not mix in the intended design.
Fluid- uid compatibility is handled by accessing a  uid
compatibility look-up table which indicates for each pair
of component chemicals covered whether or not the pair is
prone to any of the following:
· Heat generation
· Gas generation
· Interaction producing toxics
· Interaction producing  ammables
· Explosive interaction
· Violent polymerization
· Solubilization of toxics
· Other hazard
Ideally each cell in the table should be based on data,
but where this is lacking use has been made of similarity
of behaviour as between chemicals of the same reactivity
group.
The compatibility checker produces a report which is
appended to the main HAZOP results table, rather than
integrated into the table at the point where it is produced,
because of the numerous problems of storing the reported
interactions in association with the fault path from which
they originated and reporting these clearly in the table.
The addendum compatibility report declares the  uids
which were considered to mix, the location, the set of
interactions produced by the mixing, and the components
responsible for these interactions, for each  uid mixing
event.
Compatibility between  uids and materials of construc-
tion is also important and this also may be handled by
look-up tables, but these have not been developed for the
current version.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The overall architecture of the  uid model system, in
terms of the subsystems with which it interacts, is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
The principal sub-systems are:
1. HAZOP Algorithm—This part of HAZID drives the
HAZOP emulation procedure and makes use of the  uid
model system to validate conditions attached to SDG arcs
in fault paths.
2. Query Handler—This part of the  uid model system
evaluates queries from the HAZOP emulator, as required
during fault path validation.
3. Plant Model—The  uid model system makes use of
data stored in the Plant Model, particularly the information
on  uids present in various parts of the plant (discussed
below).
4. Function and Predicate De nitions—These are used
by the  uid model system to de ne how individual queries
are evaluated.
5. Fluid Library—This part of the FMS contains data
on the physical properties of some pure chemicals. The
properties on which data are kept are listed in Table 2 and
the chemicals covered are listed in Table 3. In the current
version the  uid library does not deal with the properties
of mixtures, except in the very limited sense that qualita-
tive properties of any component in a stream are assumed
to be valid for the whole stream.
6. Properties Package Link—This interface allows Auto-
HAZID to make use of calculations performed in external
physical properties systems, to access numerical properties
of  uids (including mixtures) present in the plant. It is
further described below.
7. Compatibility Checker—This part of the FMS per-
forms checks on pairs of  uids considered to mix in the
plant, producing lists of possible adverse interactions that
may be caused. It makes use of information stored in the
Compatibility Database.
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Table 1. Predicates and functions used in AutoHAZID.
Prototype P/F Description
PLANT, FLUID AND FAULT PATH DATA ACCESS
max_port_diam eter F Largest diameter of ports associated with the current unit.
get_attribute (AttName) F Get value of named attribute for current unit. Returns an
Atom for ‘is’ slots, or a ListType for ‘info’ slots.
get_ uid (Port) F Get current  uid for named port.
get_nominal  uid (Port) F Get nominal  uid for named port.
set_ uid (Port,F1) P Set the current  uid for given port to be the  uid F1.
get_pressure (Fluid) F Gets numerical value of pressure for given  uid.
get_temperatur e (Fluid) F Gets numerical value of temperature for given  uid.
get_composition (Fluid,Comp) F Gets mole fraction of named component in the  uid.
set_pressure (Fluid,Value) F Sets the pressure of the given  uid to be Value, returning
the modi ed  uid.
set_temperatur e (Fluid,Value) F Sets the temperature of the given  uid to be Value,
returning the modi ed  uid.
set_composition (Fluid,Comp,Va l) F Sets the mole fraction of Comp in Fluid to Val, returning
the modi ed  uid.
this_unit F Name of the current context unit.
insulation P Is the current plant unit insulated?
dead_heading_pre ssure F Retrieves the dead-heading pressure for the unit concerned
(typically a pump), from the attribute ‘‘dead_head_
pressure’’.
full_dh_pressure (Port) F Determines the maximum pressure a pump or compressor
will see if its discharge (Port) is blocked off. This is the
sum of dead-heading pressure and operating pressure of
pump inlet.
vessel_height F Gets the height, in metres, of the current unit (typically a
vessel), from the attribute ‘‘vessel_height’ ’.
vessel_volume F Gets the volume, in cubic metres, of the current unit
(typically a vessel), from the attribute ‘‘vessel_volume’ ’.
max_design_pre ssure F Finds the maximum design pressure for the equipment item
being considered. Uses the attribute ‘‘max_allowable_ -
pressure’’.
min_design_pres sure F Finds the minimum design pressure for the equipment item
being considered. Uses the attribute ‘‘min_allowable_
pressure’’.
min_design_tem perature F Finds the minimum allowable temperature for the equip-
ment being examined.
max_design_tem perature F Finds the maximum allowable temperature for the
equipment being examined.
LIMIT DATA ACCESS
Note: Three types of operation are implemented in this part of the FMS:
1. The functions beginning with ‘get_min_’ and ‘get_max_’ return the values of the relevant limit, for the  uid given as the  rst argument of the function.
2. The functions beginning with ‘set_min_’ and ‘set_max_’ modify the limit data for the  uid in the  rst argument. They return the modi ed  uid, but do not
change the data associated with any port in the current  uids list.
3. The predicates beginning with ‘assign_’ are used to change the current  uid data associated with the given port, so that it has the given limit value. They
always return true.
get_min_tempe rature (Fluid) F Finds the minimum temperature for the given  uid.
get_max_tempe rature (Fluid) F Finds the maximum temperature for the given  uid.
get_min_pressu re (Fluid) F Finds the minimum pressure for the given  uid.
get_max_pressure (Fluid) F Finds the maximum pressure for the given  uid.
get_min_compos ition (Fluid,Comp) F Gets the minimum composition of the component in the
 uid given.
get_max_compo sition (Fluid,Comp) F Gets the maximum composition of the component in the
 uid given.
set_min_tempe rature (Fluid,Value) F Sets the minimum temperature of the given  uid to Value.
Returns the modi ed  uid.
set_max_tempe rature (Fluid,Value) F Sets the maximum temperature of the given  uid to value.
Returns the modi ed  uid.
set_min_pressu re (Fluid,Value) F Sets the minimum pressure of the given  uid to Value.
Returns the modi ed  uid.
set_max_pressure (Fluid,Value) F Sets the maximum pressure of the given  uid to Value.
Returns the modi ed  uid.
set_min_compos ition (Fluid,Comp,Val) F Sets the minimum composition of the component in the
given  uid to be Val, returning the modi ed  uid.
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Table 1. continued
Prototype P/F Description
set_max_composition (Fluid,Comp,Va l) F Sets the maximum composition of the component in the
given  uid to be Val, returning the modi ed  uid.
assign_min_tem perature (Port,Val) P Assigns a minimum temperature value to the current  uid
data for the given port.
assign_max_temperature (Port,Val) P Assigns a maximum temperature value to the current  uid
data for the given port.
assign_min_pres sure (Port,Val) P Assigns a minimum pressure value to the current  uid data
for the given port.
assign_max_pre ssure (Port, Val) P Assigns a maximum pressure value to the current  uid
data for the given port.
equalise_pressu re (X,Y) P Sets the limit pressures of ports X and Y so that the max.
pressure of the low pressure port is the current pressure of
the high pressure one and the min. pressure of the high
pressure port is the current value of the low pressure one.
Ports may be in any order. Used to model the pressure
equalisation which can occur in a heat exchanger interface
failure. Sets no limits if one or both of the pressures are not
known.
COMBINING FLUIDS (INCLUDING COMPATIBILITY CHECKS)
 uid_mixture (Flu1,Flu2) F Finds the  uid corresponding to mixing the two given
 uids together, without doing any compatibility checks.
mix_ uids (F1,F2) F Mixes the  uids F1 and F2 together to produce a third  uid,
which is returned. Calls on the compatibility table checks.
compatibility_che ck (F1,F2) F Runs check on the compatibility of the components in the
given  uids. This checks the components in the  uids via
the reactivity group matrix.
add_to_compat_r eport (Rep) P Adds the results (Rep) produced by the compatibility check
to the overall compatibility report for the HAZOP.
PROPERTIES OF SINGLE FLUIDS
liquid (Port) P Could the  uid associated with the given port contain a
liquid phase component?
solidsPresent (Port) P Could solids be present in the  uid in Port?
freezing (Port) P Are any of the components of the  uid at the given port
below their freezing point at the current temperature?
 ammable (Port) P Is the  uid in the given port  ammable?
toxic (Port) P Is the  uid in the given port toxic? Uses the function
toxicity( ), which relies on  uid library info.
crystalliser (Port) P Determines if the  uid in the given port is likely to
crystallise.
polymeriser (Port) P Determines if the  uid in the given port is likely to
polymerise.
dissolvedGas (Port) P Determines if the  uid in the given port contains dissolved
gas components.
brittle (Port) P Are the materials of construction associated with the given
port likely to become brittle at a low temperature?
decomp (Port) P Is the  uid in the given port likely to undergo decompo-
sition?
state (Fluid) F Given a  uid, determine its state, as one of the following:
[unknown, vapour, liquid, solid, vap_liq, solid_vap,
solid_liq, solid_vap_liq].
boiling_temp_ran ge (Fluid) F Finds the range of temperatures over which the given  uid
will boil at its current pressure. Returned in the form of a
list: [lowvalue, highvalue].
mol_weight (Fluid) F Returns the average molecular weight of the given  uid.
freezing_temp (Fluid) F Returns the temperature at which the  rst component in the
 uid begins to freeze, from liquid.
vapour_pressure (Fluid) F Returns the vapour pressure exerted by the  uid at its
current temperature
viscosity (Fluid) F Returns the viscosity of the given  uid at current
conditions.
density (Fluid) F Returns the density of the given  uid at current conditions.
enthalpy (Fluid) F Calculates the speci c enthalpy of the given  uid.
speci c_heat (Fluid) F Calculates the speci c heat capacity of the given  uid.
latent_heat_fusion (Fluid) F Calculates the latent heat of fusion for the given  uid.
latent_heat_evap (Fluid) F Calculates the latent heat of evaporation for the given  uid.
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Table 1. continued
Prototype P/F Description
phase_tempera tures (Fluid) F Calculates the temperature limits of phase change for the
given  uid, in the form [freezing_point, boiling_point].
phase_pressures (Fluid) F Calculates the pressure limits of phase change for the given
 uid, in the form [press_vapour, press_solid].
 ashpoint_temp (Fluid) F Returns the closed cup  ash point temperature of the given
 uid.
autoignition_temp (Fluid) F Returns the AIT of the given  uid.
lower_ amm_limit (Fluid) F Return the lower  ammable limit of the given  uid.
upper_ amm_limit (Fluid) F Return the upper  ammable limit of the given  uid.
cas_number (Comp) F Returns the CAS number of the given  uid component.
vacuum (Port) P Is the port under vacuum?
pressurised (Port) P Is the port under pressure?
nearBoiling Point (Port) P Is the  uid in Port near its boiling point?
vapour (Port) P Does the  uid in Port contain vapour?
 ashRelease (Port) P Would the  uid in Port  ash if depressurised to 1 bara?
brittleFlash (Port) P Check to see if any of the components in the  uid at the
given port will cause the material of construction to be
weakened if  ashed to atmospheric pressure.
foamer (Port) P Check to see if the  uid in the named port contains a
component liable to cause foaming.
solid (Port) P Does the  uid present for Port contain solid?
corrosion (Port) P Are the materials associated with Port susceptible to
corrosion?
hydrocarbon (Port) P Succeeds if the  uid associated with the named port
contains a hydrocarbon component.
exothermic Reaction (Port) P Succeeds if an exothermic reaction is intended at the given
port.
endothermic Reaction (Port) P Succeeds if an endothermic reaction is intended at the
given port.
hazardous (Port) P Succeeds if the  uid at the given port is toxic or  ammable.
non_hazardous (Port) P Succeeds if the  uid at the given port is non-toxic and non-
 ammable.
toxicity (Fluid) F Returns the toxicity of the given  uid, according to the data
in the  uid library. This is the max. value for the
components in the  uid, or 2 1 if some value or component
is unknown to the  uid library.
vp_at_given_temp (Fluid,Temp) F Determines the vapour pressure of the given  uid at the
given temperature.
 uid_can_freeze (Port) P Succeeds if the current  uid associated with the given port
can attain a temperature below its freezing point. Makes
use of lower limit temperature of  uid.
CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION
get_consequence F Gets the consequence belonging to the current-fault path,
or ‘error’ if the path is not a completed one.
is_consequence_ty pe (Conseq,Code) P Checks the consequence given to see if it has the given
code value as a standard type of consequence.
get_consequence_ rank (Conseq) F Returns the rank number of the given consequence.
get_consequence_ cat (Conseq) F Returns the category of the given consequence (from none,
haz, op, haz_op).
loc_eval (Fluid,Type) F Loss of containment evaluation. Given a  uid and the type
either ‘‘toxic’’ or ‘‘ ammable’’, the function determines a
rank value for the generic loss of containment event for
that  uid.
CONTAMINATION
add_air_contami nation (Port) P Adds air as a contaminant to the current  uid at Port,
changing the current  uid there.
add_contaminatio n (Fluid,CmpList ) F Add a number of compounds as contaminants to the  uid,
returning the new  uid.
 uid_from_components (CompList) F Given a list of component names, makes a  uid containing
those components. Used by add_contamination ( ) to
produce a  uid containing a list of named contaminants.
make_ uid_contaminant (Fluid) F Makes all the components of the  uid into contaminants,
returning the modi ed  uid. Also used by add_contamina-
tion( ) to add named contaminants to another  uid.
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Table 1. continued
Prototype P/F Description
becomes_toxic (Port) P Detects if the  uid belonging to the named port has
changed from a nominal  uid which is not toxic, to a
current  uid which is toxic.
becomes_ ammable (Port) P Detects if the  uid belonging to the named port has
changed from a nominal  uid which is not  ammable, to a
current  uid which is  ammable.
port_port_contam ination (HP_Port, LP_Port) P Transfers the  uid present in the  rst (high pressure) port to
the second (lower pressure) port, as a contaminant.
Includes  uid compatibility checks. Sets the composition
of LP_Port to the mixture of components, for use in (for
example) contamination arcs for interface failure in heat
exchangers.
DESIGN PARAMETERS CHECKS
exceed_design_pr essure (Port) P Determines if the maximum pressure at the port can exceed
the design pressure of the unit.
exceed_design_va cuum (Port) P Determines if the minimum pressure at the port can go
below the minimum design pressure of the unit.
design_overTemp (Port) P Can the  uid at the given port exceed the upper design
temperature of the equipment?
design_underTem p (Port) P Can the  uid at the given port be less than the lower design
temperature limit of the equipment?
MISCELLANEOUS PHYSICAL CHECKS
boiling (Port1,Port2) P Does the  uid boil between Port1 and Port2?
rollOver (Port) P Checks to see if the vessel containing the given port is large
enough to experience the ‘‘rollover’’ phenomenon. This
limit is arbitrarily set at 50 cubic metres.
hot (Port) P Arbitrary test to see if the given port is above ambient
temperature (limit set at 35 degrees C).
low_press (Port) P Test to see if the pressure of the given port is less than 2
bara. Used for classifying vessels.
hot_weather_tem p F Returns the maximum ambient temperature for hot weather
(currently set at 40°C).
cold_weather_temp F Returns the minimum ambient temperature for cold
weather (currently set at 2 30°C).
LEAKAGE CHECKS AND LIMITATIONS
pressureLeak (Port) P Sets the low pressure limit value for a leak out of a
pressurised system. Tests that the port is pressurised and if
it is, sets the minimum pressure for that port to be 1.0 bara.
vacuumLeak (Port) P Sets the high pressure limit value for a leak into a vacuum
process. Tests that the port is under vacuum and if it is, sets
the maximum pressure for that port to be 1.0 bara.
CHECKS ON VLE PRESSURE LIMITATIONS
vle_pressure_lim its (L,V) P Sets pressure limits for a vapour port (V), based on vapour
liquid equilibrium between V and the liquid port (L). Uses
the limit values of temperature for the liquid port and a
calculation of vapour pressure for the liquid. Changes the
limit values of the current  uid data for V.
vle_min_pressu re_limit (L,V) P Sets minimum pressure for the vapour port (V) based on
the vapour pressure of the liquid in the liquid port (L) at the
minimum temperature limit so far determined for the
liquid. Changes the lower pressure limit of current  uid
data for V.
vle_max_pressure_limit (L,V) P Sets maximum pressure for the vapour port (V) based on
the vapour pressure of the liquid in the liquid port (L) at the
maximum temperature limit so far determined for the
liquid. Changes the upper pressure limit of current  uid
data for V.
PRESSURE LIMITS IN FLOW PATHS WHEN RESISTANCE CHANGES
res_dsp_limit (USPort,DSPort) P Sets the maximum pressure of the downstream port, DSPort,
to be the maximum pressure of the upstream port, USPort, or
the nominal pressure, if there is no de ned maximum for
USPort.
res_usp_limit (USPort,DSPort) P Sets the minimum pressure of the upstream port, USPort, to
be the minimum pressure of the downstream port, DSPort,
or the nominal pressure, if there is no de ned minimum for
DSPort.
Plant Fluid Data
An important part of the plant model during hazard
identi cation, and particularly during fault path validation,
is the information on  uids present in the plant. The
acquisition and propagation of information on the  uids
present at each point in the plant is termed ‘plant  uid
speci cation’ and has already been described in the  rst
paper in the series1.
The set of  uid data corresponding to the intended
design conditions is derived from the information given
in the plant description input to AutoHAZID and is termed
the ‘‘nominal  uid’’ model. There is also the slightly
different set of  uid data, called the ‘current  uid’ model,
which corresponds to the conditions associated with the
fault path under consideration. The current  uids may differ
from the nominal  uids due to changes associated with
pressure or temperature deviations, or due to composition
changes caused by  uid mixing or contamination.
Rules are required which govern the extent to which
current  uids propagate their properties from one location
to another, along a fault path. The approach used so far is
that, when arcs connect two locations with the same vari-
able (taken from the set composition, contamination,  ow,
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Figure 1. Architecture of the  uid query handling system.
Table 2. Properties of chemicals held in the  uid model library.
CAS number
Molecular weight
Freezing point, °C
Decomposition temperature, °C
Flash point, °C
Autoignition temperature, °C
Lower  ammability limit, % v/v
Toxicity classi cation
Latent heat (at normal boiling point), J mole 2 1
Normal boiling point, °C
Vapour pressure: Antoine constant A
Vapour pressure: Antoine constant B
Vapour pressure: Antoine constant C
Liquid density at speci ed temperature, kg m 2 3
Vapour heat capacity: constant A, J mole 2 1
Vapour heat capacity: constant B, J mole 2 1
Vapour heat capacity: constant C, J mole 2 1
Vapour heat capacity: constant D, J mole 2 1
Toxicity limit for Dow Chemical Exposure Index: ERPG value, mg m 2 3
Liquid heat capacity at speci ed temperature, J kg 2 1 °C 2 1
Reactivity group 1
Reactivity group 2
Reactivity group 3
Reactivity group 4
Table 3. Names of chemicals whose properties are held in the  uid
model library.
Component identi cation Formula IUPAC name
Water H2O Water
Nitrogen N2 Dinitrogen
Hydrogen H2 Dihydrogen
Hydrogen cyanide HCN Hydrogen cyanide
Ammonia NH3 Ammonia
Ammonium sulphate NH4SO4 Ammonium sulfate
Sulphuric acid H2SO4 Sulfuric acid
Methane CH4 Methane
Ethane C2H6 Ethane
Ethylene C2H4 Ethene
Propane C3H8 Propane
Propylene C3H8 Propene
Butane C4H10 Butane
Butylene C4H8 Butene
Ethylene dichloride C2H4Cl2 1,2-Dichloroeth ane
Hydrogen sulphide H2S Dihydrogen sul de
Sulphur dioxide SO2 Sulphur dioxide
Chlorine Cl2 Dichlorine
Sodium hydroxide NaOH Sodium hydroxide
Hydrogen chloride HCl Hydrogen chloride
Hexane C6H14 Hexane
Toluene C6H5CH3 Toluene
Benzene C6H6 Benzene
Carbon dioxide CO2 Carbon dioxide
Carbon monoxide CO Carbon monoxide
Oxygen O2 Dioxygen
1,2-dichlorodi uoromethane CF2Cl2 dichlorodi uoromethane
1,1-trichloro uoromethane CCl3F trichloro uoromethane
revFlow), the current  uid is transferred from the left side
location of the arc to the right side, provided that there is
nothing in the arc condition to contradict this.
Physical Properties Package Interface
Some of the predicates and functions in the FMS can
make use of calculations performed in external software
systems designed to calculate physical properties data,
such as those in process simulator systems. The interface
to these physical properties systems allows calculation
requests to be passed out of and results passed back to, the
FMS. Within the STOPHAZ project access to one such
properties system, Properties Plus by Aspentech, has been
demonstrated and a similar link to HYSIM by Hyprotech
has been created.
After a link to the physical properties package has been
con gured (which requires that AutoHAZID specify the list
of  uids and properties needed from the package), requests
may be made for speci c physical properties of speci ed
 uids, or for  ash calculations to be performed. The list
of physical properties supported by the interface is given
in Table 4.
Flash calculations are also supported by the physical pro-
perties package interface. For this AutoHAZID passes the
composition of the  ashing  uid and either the pressure or
the temperature of the  ash to the property system, which
then performs a  ash calculation. The call returns the num-
ber and types of phases (e.g., vapour and liquid, vapour and
two liquids, etc.) and the compositions of these phases. This
function, though implemented, has been little used so far.
EVALUATION OF CONSEQUENCES
The evaluation of consequences discovered by the
HAZOP algorithm involves the validation, classi cation
and ranking of the consequences before their reporting in
the HAZID output report. The validation task is implemen-
ted by the  uid model system, as described above, and deter-
mines if a consequence does have a credible realization.
In combination with  ltering, fault path validation
ensures a better ordering and a validation of the faults
reported, but it still remains to differentiate between those
consequences which are of signi cance and those which
are not. The natural way to proceed in the evaluation of
the consequences is to rank them. In order to do this it is
necessary to develop a set of rules for ranking. The
formulation of these rules entails the de nition of a set of
standard consequences.
Note that the consequence evaluation system described
below was developed quite late in the project and only
parts of it have been implemented to date. However, all
the elements for the system, such as the conditional arcs
in the unit models and the  uid model system, are present
in the current software.
Standard Consequences
The standard consequences in the current version are
as follows:
· Personal injury
· Loss of containment
· Equipment damage
· Operating problem
· Loss of outlet  ow
· Contamination of outlet  ow
· Explosive mixture
· Unintended reaction
· Vibration
· Ignition source
· Device malfunction
The list has been developed by trial and error, the criteria
for inclusion of a consequence in the list, or exclusion from
it, being that the list should be relatively short but com-
prehensive. Another consideration is that the consequences
listed should correspond broadly to those at which, in a
conventiona l HAZOP, the propagation process is stopped
and the event is evaluated and, if appropriate, recorded.
The following comments may be made on the items
selected for the list.
Personal injury
Personal injury is the most signi cant consequence, but
whether it occurs is likely to depend on factors not
considered in the current version of AutoHAZID. The
crucial feature is the exposure of personnel, which is a
function of the type of plant, the location of the equipment,
the location of personnel, various management issues, etc.
It is envisaged that this consequence may be generated by
combining other consequences such as loss of containment
or explosive mixture with information on exposure.
Loss of containment, Equipment damage,
Operating problem
Loss of containment is probably the consequence which
features most prominently in HAZOP outputs. The propa-
gation process is stopped at this point and the event is
evaluated. Equipment damage and Operating problem are
also events at which propagation is terminated and an
evaluation is made.
Loss of outlet  ow, Contamination of outlet  ow
These are often intermediate events in a chain which
may end, for example, in Loss of containment. They are
included, however, because they are frequently terminations
in their own right.
Explosive mixture, Unintended reaction, Vibration, Ignition
source, Device malfunction
These are ‘specials’, the justi cation for their inclusion
being that they are terminations. Device malfunction
refers to any event which may affect the functioning of
equipment such as an instrument or a protective device.
There are certain events which are conspicuous by their
absence. For example, Vapour cloud explosion is not in
the list. Essentially it is covered by Loss of containment
and Ignition source.
In order to apply a method of ranking based on standard
consequences in AutoHAZID unit models, it is necessary
to specify for each consequence a corresponding standard
consequence, or set of such standard consequences. Table 5
illustrates (for a centrifugal pump and for some more
generic consequences) the links between consequences
and the standard consequence classes, with associated
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conditions which have to be met for the standard conse-
quence to apply. These relationships have been developed
for incorporation in the unit models.
Classi cation
A necessary preliminary to ranking of the consequences
is to classify them with respect to the type of problem posed.
The classi cation in this case is extremely simple—
problems are classi ed as either hazards or operability
problems. In some instances the assignment is to a degree
arbitrary. For example, cavitation in a pump may be
classi ed as an operating problem, although if neglected
it could constitute a hazard.
Severity Ranking
The method of ranking used is to rank each event on a
severity scale. The two classes of problem, hazard (H) and
operability problem (OP), are treated separately.
For hazards, there already exist a number of methods
of ranking, such as rapid ranking and preliminary hazard
assessment (PHA). It was judged desirable to make the
system adopted in this project conformable with these.
Table 6, Section A, gives an outline of some ranking
schemes described in the literature.
These schemes use  ve levels of seriousness, or severity,
and this number has been adopted in the present work.
The ranking is 1–5 in increasing order of seriousness.
Two of the papers cited in Table 6 give an interpreta-
tion of seriousness in terms of potential fatalities. This is
shown in Section B of the table. The hazard ranking
scheme adopted in AutoHAZID is based on those given
in Table 6 and is closest to that of Wells, Phang et al.5
Table 7 of these authors gives further details of their
scheme.
The scheme used for hazards in AutoHAZID is shown
in Table 8, Section A. A scheme is also required for
the ranking of operating problems and this is shown in
Section B of Table 8.
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Table 4. Property system interface: property requests available.
Description Inputs Outputs
Physical state Method Phase (integer)
Component list 1=Vapour
Component mole fractns 2=Liquid
3=Vapour+Liquid
No. of components 4=Solid
Temperature 5=Solid+Vapour
Pressure 6=Solid+Liquid
7=Solid+Vapour+Liquid
Molecular weight Component list Average molecular weight ( oating)
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Boiling temperature Method Dew point ( oating)
Component list (Boiling point if one component)
Component mole fractns Bubble point ( oating)
No. of components (Missing if one component)
Pressure
Freezing temperature Method Freezing temperature of  rst component ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Vapour pressure Method Vapour pressure ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Viscosity Method Vapour viscosity ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns Liquid viscosity ( oating)
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Density Method Density ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Speci c enthalpy Method Speci c enthalpy ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Equipment Susceptibilities in Consequence Validation
An aspect of the consequence validation process, not so
far mentioned, is examination of equipment susceptibilities.
In some cases a consequence is conditional on a suscept-
ibility in the equipment, which can frequently be entered
as a condition on an arc in the unit model, for validation
by the FMS. For example, in a water separator unit the
consequence ‘Poor separation’ might be caused by several
deviations, one of which is contamination in the form of a
foaming agent. The following standard consequences may
in some cases require validation:
1. Equipment damage.
2. Operating problem.
3. Loss of outlet  ow.
4. Contamination of outlet  ow.
5. Explosive mixture.
6. Unintended reaction.
7. Device malfunction.
Rules for Ranking
A set of rules has been developed for ranking standard
consequences, both hazards (H) and operability problems
(O). These rules are grouped according to their context:
SC Rules for Standard Consequences
LC Rules for Loss of Containment
ED Rules for Equipment Damage
OP Rules for Operating Problem
LF Rules for Loss of outlet Flow
CF Rules for Contamination of outlet Flow
EM Rules for Explosive Mixture
UR Rules for Unintended Reaction
VB Rules for Vibration
IS Rules for Ignition Source
DM Rules for Device Malfunction
Explosive mixture refers to an explosive mixture within the
plant and not to a mixture arising from a leak of  ammable
material.
The set of rules developed is regarded as tentative and
subject to modi cation in the light of experience. In some
cases the rule is to a degree arbitrary. The current set of
rules is given in Table 9, which also indicates, in the second
column, the validation needs of each of the standard
consequences.
The information to be provided for the evaluation of
standard consequences, when de ning a new unit model,
may be summarized as follows:
1. Assignment of each terminating deviation to a standard
consequence.
2. Function of equipment:
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Table 4. continued
Description Inputs Outputs
Speci c heat Method Speci c heat ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Latent heat of fusion Method Latent heat of fusion ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Latent heat of evaporation Method Latent heat of evaporation ( oating)
Component list
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure
Temperature limit of phase change Method Freezing point temperature
Component list Boiling point temperature
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Temperature
Pressure limit of phase change Method Freezing point pressure
Component list Boiling point pressure
Component mole fractns
No. of components
Pressure
Flash point (closed cup) Component name Flash point ( oating)
Autoignition temperature Component name Autoignition temperature ( oating)
Lower  ammability limit Component name Lower  ammability limit ( oating)
Upper  ammability limit Component name Upper  ammability limit ( oating)
CAS number Component name CAS number (integer)
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Table 5. Relationships between deviations and standard consequences.
Condition for consequence (G or ES) to result in
Standard consequence Generic (G) or equipment speci c (ES) consequence2 standard consequence
Loss of containment Overpressure/burst
Underpressure
Overtemperature/loss of strength M: HT
Undertemperature/brittle fracture M: LT
Outleak
Spontaneous
Valve open
Drain valve open
Sample valve open
Vent open
Cavitation
Dry running
Dead heading
Reverse rotation
Seal failure U: Pump possesses seals
Loss of lubricant U: Pump possesses lubrication system
Loss of cooling U: Pump possesses cooling system
Equipment damage Cavitation
Dry running
Dead heading
Reverse rotation
Seal failure U: Pump possesses seals
Loss of lubricant U: Pump possesses lubrication system
Loss of cooling U: Pump possesses cooling system
Operating problem Cavitation
Dry running
Dead heading
Reverse rotation
Seal failure U: Pump possesses seals
Loss of lubricant U: Pump possesses lubrication system
Loss of cooling U: Pump possesses cooling system
Loss of outlet  ow No outlet  ow
Contamination of outlet  ow Contamination of outlet  ow
Explosive mixture Unintended component in unit/outlet  ow F: resultant mixture contains either  ammable
component(s) + air, oxygen, chlorine or compo-
nent capable of decomposition
Unintended reaction Unintended component in unit/outlet  ow F: Resultant mixture capable of unintended
reaction
Vibration Direct fault3 U: Model contains the direct fault
Cavitation
Ignition source Outleak (static electricity)4
Bearing failure
Device malfunction Overpressure U: Unit model may contain conditions indicating
Underpressure susceptibilities of device to individual
Overtemperature consequences; otherwise they must be reported or
Undertemperature not reported en bloc
Erosion
Corrosion
Blockage
Viscosity change, etc.
Notes:
1. The table is illustrative rather than comprehensive.
2. Generic consequences are given in italics and equipment speci c consequences in roman script. The latter refer by way of illustration to a centrifugal
pump.
3. Direct fault means that unit model contains a fault which results directly in the standard consequence, e.g. vibration on a rotating machine.
4. An outleak generating static electricity need not necessarily be that of a  ammable  uid. Steam, for example, can generate static.
5. F,  uid model; M, materials of construction model (within  uid model system); U, unit model.
· Susceptibility to speci ed deviation;
· Classi cation of this susceptibility;
· Ranking of this susceptibility.
3. Function of instruments and protective devices:
· Classi cation of protective devices;
· Classi cation of instruments for operation.
As indicated in Table 9, where the unit model does not
supply the information required, the current set of rules
does in some cases supply a default value, e.g., Equipment
damage is classi ed as H and ranked as H3.
Quantitative Models
In some cases a consequence may be ranked by making
a call to a quantitative model. In principle, AutoHAZID
supports the use of such models although only the loss of
containment model described below is included in the
current version. In general, the use of quantitative models
is likely to require considerable amounts of additional data
and they should therefore be used sparingly.
The most obvious example of the potential for use
of quantitative modelling is Loss of containment of a
hazardous  uid, one which is  ammable or toxic or both.
A quantitative model has therefore been developed to
estimate the effects of a hazardous release. Since the project
is concerned with HAZOP emulation rather than with
hazard modelling, a model was sought which is simple and
which preferably could be taken ‘off the shelf’. The model
used is an adaptation of that given in the Dow Chemical
Exposure Index Guide6. The details of the model are
described in Appendix A, and Appendix B gives illustrative
examples of the use of the model to obtain the rank of a
Loss of containment event, for a toxic and for a  ammable
 uid. In outline, the model comprises the following stages:
1. Selection of scenario (rupture of pipe, hose, vessel; tank
over ow).
2a. Calculate emission (gas).
2b. Calculate emission (liquid).
3. Calculate mass released.
4. Calculate  ash fraction.
5. Calculate airborne quantity due to  ash.
6. Calculate pool size.
7. Calculate airborne quantity due to evaporation.
8. Calculate of total airborne quantity.
9a. Calculate hazard distance and injury/fatality areas
(toxic release).
9b. Calculate hazard distance and injury/fatality areas
( ammable release).
10a. Calculate appropriate population density (toxic
release).
10b.Calculate appropriate population density ( ammable
release).
11. Calculate number of injuries and fatalities.
12. Calculate hazard rank.
CONCLUSIONS
In a system for HAZOP emulation based around
qualitative models, such as HAZID, the proliferation of
identi ed hazards is a major problem, because of the fact
that the many infeasible scenarios thrown up by qualitative
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Table 6. Outline of some hazard ranking schemes.
A. Outline of schemes
Rank Seriousness Guide frequency, yr 2 1
Gillett3 5 Total destruction 10 2 4
4 Severe 10 2 3
3 Major 10 2 2
2 Appreciable 10 2 1
1 Minor 1
Stevens and Stickles4 5 Catastrophic
4 Critical
3 Substantial
2 Marginal
1 Minor
Wells, Phang et al.5 5 Catastrophic 10 2 5
4 Severe 10 2 4
3 Major 10 2 3
2 Appreciable 10 2 2
1 Minor 10 2 1
B. Interpretation of ‘seriousness’
Fatalities
Rank Plant Public
Gillett3 5 Multiple 1
4 1 0.1
3 0.1
Wells, Phang et al.5 5 3+ 1
4 1 0.1
3 0.1
reasoning may swamp genuinely interesting results. The
 uid model system was developed to tackle this problem
by validating the fault paths using checks based on
qualitative and quantitative information about the  uids in
the plant. A description has been given of the predicate
and function system used in the FMS, and an interesting
class of fault path validation problems (those entailing the
modelling of numerical limits on the magnitude of process
variable deviations) has been explored.
The other operation carried out by the  uid model system
was also described; this is the detection and reporting
of  uid interactions resulting from unintended mixture of
process  uids.
The  uid model system co-ordinates the activity of a
number of subsystems, which allow it to access information
from various sources within HAZID and from external
programs, to resolve its queries. A brief overview of the
system architecture was given, highlighting this aspect
of the FMS.
A method for the systematic evaluation of terminating
events has been developed, based around the idea of
actual consequences being instances of a limited number
of standard consequence types. The method allows for the
classi cation and ranking of consequences and provides
a framework and some guide rules for the development of
unit models.
The various techniques described in this paper are all
directed at improving the quality of output from HAZID.
However, they also embody important modelling issues
which should be represented in any system that is to tackle
the identi cation of hazards by a model-based approach.
APPENDIX A
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT: MODEL
This appendix gives a detailed description of the model
used for estimating the effects of a loss of containment of
a hazardous substance. The stages of the model are listed
in the main text and are given here in detail.
1. Select scenario
Pipe
D = d d < 50
= 50 50 # d # 100
= 0.5d d > 100
where d is the diameter of the pipe (mm) and D the effective
diameter for emission (mm).
Hose
D = d
Vessel
d = dv
then apply relations for pipes above.
Tank over ow
D = 50
2. Calculate emissions
Equations are given for mass  ows of gas and of liquid.
It is necessary, however, to take into account also the
inventory and the period of release. The total mass released
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Table 7. Hazard ranking scheme of Wells, Phang et al.5
CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES: Severity 5
Catastrophic damage and severe clean-up costs
On-site: loss of normal occupancy > 3 months
Off-site: loss of normal occupancy > 1 month
Severe national pressure to shut down
Three or more fatalities of plant personnel
Fatality of member of public or at least  ve injuries
Damage to SSI or historic building
Severe environmental damage involving permanent or long-term damage
to a signi cant area of land
SEVERE CONSEQUENCES: Severity 4
Severe damage and major clean-up
Major effect on business with loss of occupancy up to 3 months
Possible damage to public property
Single fatality or injuries to more than  ve plant personnel
A 1 in 10 chance of a public fatality
Short-term environmental damage over a signi cant area of land
Severe media reaction
MAJOR CONSEQUENCES: Severity 3
Major damage and minor clear-up
Minor effect on business but no loss of building occupancy
Injuries to less than  ve plant personnel and 1 in 10 chance of fatality
Some hospitalisation of public
Short-term environmental damage to water, land,  ora or fauna
Considerable media reaction
APPRECIABLE CONSEQUENCES: Severity 2
Appreciable damage to plant
No effect on business
Reportable near miss incident under CIMAH
Injury to plant personnel
Minor annoyance to public
MINOR CONSEQUENCES: Severity 1
Near-miss incident with signi cant quantity released
Minor damage to plant
No effect on business
Possible injury to plant personnel
No effect on public, possible smell
Table 8. Ranking schemes for hazards and for
operability problems in AutoHAZID.
A. Hazards
Rank Severity
5 Catastrophic
4 Severe
3 Major
2 Appreciable
1 Minor
B. Operability problems
Rank Severity
5 Very serious
4 Serious
3 Quite serious
2 Minor
1 Trivial
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Table 9. Current set of rules for evaluation of standard consequences.
Context of rule Validation3 Rule number Rule
Standard consequence SC SC1 If the standard consequence is LoC, then pass for classi cation and ranking.
SC2 If the standard consequence is ED, then pass for validation, classi cation and
ranking.
SC3 If the standard consequence is OP, then pass for validation, classi cation and
ranking.
SC4 If the standard consequence is LF, then pass for validation, classi cation and
ranking.
SC5 If the standard consequence is CF, then pass for validation, classi cation and
ranking.
SC6 If the standard consequence is EM, then pass for validation, classi cation and
ranking.
SC7 If the standard consequence is UR, then classify as H, and pass for ranking.
SC8 If the standard consequence is VB, then classify as O and pass for ranking.
SC9 If the standard consequence is IS, then classify as H and pass for ranking.
SC10 If the standard consequence is DM, then pass for classi cation and ranking.
Loss of containment LC N/A LC1 If the  uid model system con rms  uid is non- ammable and non-toxic, then
classify as O and rank as O1; otherwise classify as H.
LC2 If the  uid is  ammable, then apply the  ammable LoC procedure.
LC3 If the  uid is toxic, then apply the toxic LoC procedure.
LC4 If the  uid is  ammable and toxic, then select the highest rank yielded by
Rules LC3 and LC4.
Equipment damage ED V (U) ED1 If the SC is ED, then classify as H and rank as H3.
Operating problem OP V (U) OP1 If the SC is OP, then classify as O and rank as O3.
Loss of outlet  ow LF V (U) LF1 If there exists downstream a unit which has a susceptibility in its unit model to
No  ow, then declare fault validated.
LF2 If the susceptibility is speci ed in unit model as an H susceptibility, then
classify fault as H; otherwise classify it as O.
LF3 If the susceptibility is ranked in unit model, then assign the rank; otherwise
assign Default Level.
Contamination of outlet  ow CF V (U) CF1 If there exists downstream a unit which has a susceptibility in its unit model to
Contaminant, then declare fault validated.
CF2 If the susceptibility is speci ed in unit model as an H susceptibility, then
classify fault as H; otherwise classify it as O.
CF3 If the susceptibility is ranked in unit model, then assign the rank; otherwise
assign Default Level.
Explosive mixture EM1 V (F) EM1 Classify as H.
EM2 Treat as total loss of containment and apply LoC rules.
Unintended reaction UR2 V (F) UR1 If  uid model system con rms that both  uids are non- ammable and non-
toxic, classify as O and rank as O2; otherwise as H.
UR2 If the source of the abnormal  uid is (1) pinhole leak or (2) passing valve, then
rank as H2.
UR3 If the unit has pressure relief explicitly covering UR, then rank as H2.
UR4 If the SC is still unranked, treat as total loss of containment and apply LoC
rules.
Vibration VB N/A VB1 Classify as O and rank as O2.
Ignition source IS N/A IS1 If the equipment is in a Non-hazardous area, then rank as H1.
IS2 If the equipment is in Zones 1 or 2, rank as H2.
IS3 If the equipment is in Zone 0, rank as H3.
Device malfunction DM N/A DM1 If the device is part of (1) a critical measurement, (2) an alarmed
measurement, (3) part of a trip system, (4) part of an interlock system, (5) part
of a pressure relief system or (6) part of an explosion relief system, then it has
a safety-related function so classify as H; otherwise as O.
DM2 If device is classi ed as O and is identi ed as operational-criti cal, then rank as
O3; otherwise as O2.
DM3 If device is classi ed as H and is identi ed as EEMUA Category 0 or 1, then
rank as H3.
DM4 If device is classi ed as H and is identi ed as EEMUA Category 2, then rank
as H2.
Notes:
1. Explosive mixture EM refers to an explosive mixture within the plant. However, the event is ranked by the loss of containment which an internal
explosion might cause.
2. As a standard consequence UR is applicable essentially to liquids. Gas phase URs are treated as EM. If at this point UR has been validated, this is
because the  uid model system has con rmed that the two  uids react. The  uid model system has not yet been interrogated as to whether either  uid
is  ammable or toxic.
3. This column indicates if validation of the standard consequence is required: V (U), Validation by unit model; V (F), Validation by  uid model; N/A, not
applicable.
should not exceed the inventory. And there may be a time
limit to the period of the release.
2a. Calculate emission (gas)
(AQ) = 4.751 3 10 2 6 D2Pa
(MW )
T + 273( )
1/2
2b. Calculate emission (liquid)
L = 9.44 3 10 2 7 D2r1
1000 Pg
r1
+ 9.8 Dh( )1/2
3. Calculate mass released
WT =WI WI /tL # 1
= tL WI /tL > 1
t = 900
4. Calculate  ash fraction
Fv =
Cp
Hv
(Ts 2 Tb)
5. Calculate airborne quantity due to  ash
(AQf ) = 5FvL Fv < 0.2
= L Fv $ 0.2
6. Calculate pool size
WP =WT Fv = 0
=WT (1 2 5Fv ) Fv < 0.2
= 0 Fv $ 0.2
Ap = 100Wp/r1
7. Calculate airborne quantity due to evaporation
(AQp) = 9.0 3 10 2 4 (A0.95p )
(MW )Pv
(Tp + 273)
with
Tp = T Ta < T < Tb
= Tb T $ Tb
8. Calculate total airborne quantity
(AQ) = (AQf )+ (AQp) [(AQf )+ (AQp)] < L
= L [(AQf )+ (AQp)] $ L
9a. Calculate hazard distances and injury/fatality areas
(toxic release)
Use is made of the EPRG-3 value. The EPRG-3 value is
the concentration to which virtually all persons could be
exposed for one hour without life-threatening effects.
HD = 6551 (AQ)
ERPG-3( )
1/2
This is the basic Dow hazard distance.
What is required, however, is the concentration which
has, say, 50% probability of fatality for 5–10 minutes
exposure. It is necessary therefore to increase the concen-
tration, both to allow for the shorter time of exposure and
to adjust the toxic effect from injury to fatality.
Use is made of a factor of 10 for time adjustment for
concentration so that
HDi =
HD
101/2
Likewise, in order to allow for the fact that a concentration
which is fatal is higher than one which is no more than
injurious, use is made of another factor of 10 for effect
adjustment from injury to fatality so that
HDf =
HDi
101/2
Then the area for toxic injury is
Ati =
p
4
(HDi)
2
and for toxic fatality
Atf =
p
4
(HDf )
2
9b. Calculate hazard distance and injury/fatality areas
( ammable release)
For a  ammable release the same equation is used for
hazard distance, but with the lower  ammability limit in
place of the ERPG value.
Burgoyne7 lists the LFLs of hydrocarbons from which a
typical value is
Clf l = 0.05 oz ft 2 3 = 0.05 g l 2 1
= 50, 000 mg m 2 3
Hence
HDf l = 6551
(AQ)
Clf l( )
1/2
The effective diameter of the cloud is taken as half this
value
Df l = 0.5HDf l
For  ammable clouds only fatalities are calculated. For this
it is assumed that all persons inside the ignited cloud are
killed, but no others. Hence
Af l f =
p
4
(Df l)
2
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10a. Calculate appropriate population density (toxic
release)
Basic works population density
For the basic works population density use is made of a
value of Dp = 0.003 persons m–2.
Effect of escape/shelter
It is not realistic to assume that if a hazardous release
occurs, persons affected will remain in the path of the cloud.
They will seek to escape. This is particularly so for the
relatively small releases which are of principal concern
here. In some cases they will escape into, or already be in,
shelter.
It is assumed that for toxic gas clouds the probability
of no escape/shelter is 1 in 30. This effect will be taken
into account by dividing the population density by 30 or in
other words using an escape/shelter mitigation factor
E = 0.033.
The effective population density after allowance for
escape/shelter is
Dpe = EDp
10b. Calculate appropriate population density
( ammable release)
Basic works population density
The same population density is used as for the toxic
release case, namely 0.003 persons m 2 2.
Effect of escape/shelter
Again it is necessary to allow for escape/shelter. It is
assumed that for toxic gas clouds the probability of no
escape/shelter is 1 in 10 so that E = 0.1.
This value is higher than that proposed for toxic release.
One reason is that toxics tend to give more warning by
odour. Another is that whereas a toxic cloud is always
harmful, a  ammable cloud is so only when ignited, which
occurs only in a small proportion of cases. Thus people
tend more often to try to stop it and so expose themselves.
When ignition occurs, the  ame tends to spread rapidly
through the cloud.
The effective population density after allowance for
escape/shelter is
Dpe = EDp
Effect of ignition
With a  ammable cloud there is a further factor, the
probability of ignition. For a gas leak this probability
increases with the size of the leak. A graph is given in
Lees8. The line can be  tted by the equation
Pi = exp[2 4.16 + 0.642 ln(AQ)] Pi # 0.3
This equation covers the range of emission rates up to
100 kg s–1. Most emissions of interest here will be within
this range. However, for present purposes extrapolation
of the equation to higher  ows is probably acceptable.
The effective population density adjusted for cloud
ignition is
Dpei = PiDpe
11a. Calculate number of injuries and fatalities
(toxic release)
The number of injuries is then
I = AtiDpe
and of fatalities
F = AtfDpe
11b. Calculate number of injuries and fatalities
( ammable release)
Only fatalities are considered. The number of fatalities is
F = Af lf Dpei
12. Calculate hazard rank
The hazard rank is based on the system of Wells,
Phang et al.5, in particular on their relations between
rank and number of injuries and fatalities in the works.
These are:
Rank
1 Possible injury
2 Injury
3 Injuries to less than 5, one in 10 chance of fatality
4 Injuries to more than 5, single fatality
5 Three or more fatalities
Based on this the following table has been constructed:
Rank Injuries Fatalities
1 I < 0.1 F < 0.01
2 0.1 # I < 0.5 0.01 # F < 0.05
3 0.5 # I # 5 0.05 # F # 0.5
4 0.5 < F < 3
5 F $ 3
The basis of this table is as follows. The injury range
values for Ranks 1–3 are an approximate encoding of the
severity categories of Wells, Phang et al. The fatality range
values for Ranks 1–3 are one tenth of the injury values
and those for Ranks 4–5 are an approximate encoding of
these authors’ categories.
It is intended that the rank be determined both using
injuries and using fatalities, where both have been calcu-
lated, and that if there is a difference of rank, the higher
be used.
Supplied and Calculated Variables
The notation indicates whether a variable is calculated
by one of the above formulae or whether it needs to be
supplied. Some of the supplied variables can be supplied
by the  uid model system, the others relate to the loss of
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containment scenario under consideration. The exception
is the works population density.
APPENDIX B
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT:
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
This appendix gives illustrative examples of the use of
the model given in Appendix A to estimate the effects, and
to determine the rank, of loss of containment events
involving hazardous materials.
‘Small’ Toxic Release
This example, based on one given in the Dow Chemical
Exposure Index Guide6, considers the breakage of a inch
vapour connection on a 1 ton Cl2 cylinder at ambient
temperature (30°C). The Dow calculation gives
(AQ) = 0.74 kg s2 1
ERPG-3 = 58 mgm 2 3
HD = 740 m
Continuing the calculation using the present model:
HDi = 234 m
HDf = 74 m
Ati = 43, 000 m2
Atf = 4300 m2
Dp = 0.003 persons m 2 2
E = 0.03
Dpe = 0.0001 persons m 2 2
I = 4.3
F = 0.43
Rank 3
‘Small’ Flammable Release
Consider a release of 1 kg s–1 of  ammable vapour
(AQ) = 1 kg s2 1
Clf l = 5000 mg m 2 3
HDf l = 93 m
Df l = 46 m
Continuing using Df l
Af lf = 1661 m2
Dp = 0.003 persons m 2 2
E = 0.1
Dpe = 0.0003 persons m 2 2
pi = 0.016
Dpei = 4.8 3 10 2 6 persons m 2 2
F = 0.08
Rank 3
NOMENCLATURE
Supplied/calculated
variable (S, C)
Ab area of bund, m
2 S
Af lf area for fatality for  ammable cloud, m
2 C
Atf area for fatality for toxic cloud, m
2 C
Ati area for injury for toxic cloud, m
2 C
Ap area of pool, m
2 C
(AQ) total airborne quantity, kg s–1 C
(AQf) airborne quantity due to  ash-off, kg s
–1 C
(AQp) airborne quantity due to pool evaporation, kg s
–1 C
Clf l lower  ammability limit, mg m
–3 S
Cp average speci c heat, J kg 2 1 °C 2 1 S
D diameter of pipe, mm S
Dv largest diameter of pipe on vessel, mm S
D effective diameter of ori ce for emission, mm C
Df diameter of cloud (toxic release), m C
Df l effective diameter of cloud ( ammable release), m C
Dp population density inside works, persons m
–2 S
Dpe effective population density inside works, persons
m–2 C
Dpei effective population density inside works adjusted
for ignition, persons m–2 C
Dt diameter of cloud ( ammable release) C
E escape/shelter mitigation factor S
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines S
F number of fatalities C
Fv  ash fraction C
Dh height of liquid above release point, m S
Hv latent heat of vaporization, J kg
–1 S
HD hazard distance (toxic releases), m C
HDf l hazard distance ( ammable releases), m C
I number of injuries C
L emission rate, kg s–1 C
(MW ) molecular weight S
Pa absolute pressure (= Pg + 101 .35), kPa S
Pg operating gauge pressure in equipment, kPa S
Pi probability of ignition C
Pv vapour pressure of liquid at pool temperature, Tp,
kPa S
Rf l radius of cloud ( ammable release), m C
T period of release, s S
T operating temperature, °C S
Ta ambient temperature S
Tb normal boiling point, °C S
Tp characteristic pool temperature, °C C
Ts stagnation temperature (= T ) S
WI inventory of unit, kg S, C
Wp mass in pool, kg C
WT total liquid release, kg C
rl liquid density, kg m 2 3 S
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